Painless” Administrative Ways for
States with Budget Shortfalls to
Preserve or  Increase Medicaid and
S-CHIP Program Funding


C: Proactively Asking about and Paying Added
Premiums for Offered, but Untaken-up Dependent
Coverage in Employer Health Plans of Working
Spouses, Domestic Partners and Parents of Disabled
and Aged Medicaid Patients

Thomas P. McCormack 
05/07/04
 


"Painless " TOC Medicaid Main Page  

  1.
 
Working Spouses
 
   

While many if not most of those eligible for Medicaid programs are single,
divorced or widowed, some are currently married. This therefore means that married
clients who have working age Spouses---even though they may well be small minority
of the caseload---need detailed attention to uncover possible un-taken-up dependent
coverage in spouses’ job health plans.

A number of key studies of health insurance enrollment show conclusively that lower
income workers are highly unlikely to enroll their dependents in their job health plans.
(Some of these studies are available on request; however, they are long, detailed,
technical and hard to plow through!) This is because, for almost all employer-based
plans, the employee must bear a  costly premium surcharge to enroll his dependents.
For most of those making, say, $10 an hour or less (e.g., WalMart clerks, etc.) this
is simply unaffordable---even if they have seriously ill dependents. After all, food
and shelter come first at this income level.

For example, in a survey released in September,2003, the Kaiser Family Foundation
found that only 33% of employees chose to take family coverage through their
company in 2003, down from 39% in 2001. In addition, the percentage of
companies that fully subsidize family health  premiums  decreased to 15% in 2003
from 27% in 2001, the survey found. Premiums  for family coverage rose 49%
since 2000---with much of the surcharge to add coverage of  dependent family
members being deducted out of employee paychecks, except  for the most
progressive employers. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that same month
that employees must pay an average of over $228 monthly as payroll deductions
to secure dependent coverage. This means that a large percentage of spouses
eligible to get dependent coverage in a working spouse’s job health plan don’t get
enrolled by their employed spouse.

Almost all state Medicaid programs have HIPP and third party liability program
offices and staffs. But---based on information from eligibility staff---only
make further inquiry about, and then pay any due premiums for, ALREADY-
IN-FORCE health insurance policies whose existence is volunteered to them
by clients when applying! (And  since the Social Security Administration---
rather than state welfare offices—takes applications for those on SSI, states
know even less about their health insurance---and do even less about it !)  

So this phenomenon means that---even if the Medicaid program asks about
other possible health insurance (e.g., which covers drugs) on its application
forms---such patients will (somewhat misleadingly) answer that they have no
such coverage (because they're not enrolled now, because they've forgotten a
prior decision not to enroll and/or because the employed spouse didn't share
the decision to non-enroll with the spouse on the public health program). So,
to find out if an employer plan with offered dependent coverage is available from
a working spouse's employer will require careful and precise telephoned or
mailed questions to the program applicant, his or her spouse and even to the
spouse's employer's benefits office.

One way to begin to deal with this might be to have the program's enrollment/
eligibility/systems staff produce a list of those cases with spouses who've
reported earned income. (In all states, for programs determining eligibility on
family income, some data is kept on who has what sort of income). Such
cases might then receive a mailing asking for the name and telephone number of
the working spouse's employer---with follow up correspondence to the employer
to inquire if there's a health plan, the premium surcharge amount, the date of the
next Open Season and the plan's benefit package. Where a pre-existing condition
waiting period has to be "waited out"---and, of course, this is far more rare than
before thanks to the HIPPA legislation---cases would have to be monitored/diaried.
And all cases requiring premium payments and related monitoring/diarying would
obviously entail some added administrative effort.

However, such an extra effort to uncover non-election of offered employer health
insurance should prove well worthwhile: The figures cited in the studies
mentioned above all suggest that not just a large number--but an absolute
majority-- of couples with a working spouse in Medicaid’s income range have
declined offered dependent coverage in health plans due to cost.

All state Medicaid programs cover many disabled adults under age 65 (including
those whose disabilities first arose during childhood), and a few  state prescription
programs even cover disabled adults under age 65.  

All federal employee health plans, many state and local employee plans and
apparently---according to an informal survey by long-time Blue Cross Association
staff--- about 50% of private employer plans have little-known clauses which
enable grown children of employees to remain as covered dependents in the
employer plan even after the age of majority where the family can
demonstrate that a medical impairment first onset during the child's minority.

Hence, now-grown adults with disabilities who had onsets (of MR, CMI, childhood
traumas, CP or any other congenital disability) before the age of majority (18, 19,
21, 22 or however defined by the parent's employer group plan, often depending
upon whether the child was in college) can be enrolled now, for prospective
coverage
, in the employed (or still-plan-covered retiree) parent's health plan.
There would often be no additional premium if the employed parent already has
elected dependent coverage for his or her spouse---and, even where the parent
does
have to pay more for dependents to bring eligibility to the grown child—a
state can then assist needier parents/clients.
 
Identifying such juvenile-onset clients and locating and dealing with their (aging)
parents about possible employer group health coverage for them will be even more
labor-intensive than for spousal health insurance employers’ enrollment reforms.
(In many cases, parental contact information for long-grown clients is no longer
recorded in case eligibility folders.) But for costly clients on  Medicaid, it could
prove well-worthwhile in saving state funds.
 

  2. ADAP Only: Health Insurance As Dependent of  Working Domestic Partner
   

For ADAP, but not other programs, there's still another group of dependents of
workers whose health insurance premiums can be paid by state Ryan White
programs as a tool to stretch limited funds. These are those clients living with
domestic partners who are working for employers which permit enrollment of
such partners in the employer health plan. These are mostly gay couples; but
there are probably numbers of straight unmarried couples too.

At
www.hrc.org , at the "worknet" and then the "domestic partner" icons, are listed
the 9 states, 136 or more localities and many but not all of those enlightened private
employers that offer their employees the right to enroll their domestic partners in
employer group health plans. There's even a query function to find out about particular
employers as well as a "2002:State of the Workplace" report offering even more
updated information about domestic partner health insurance offerings by progressive
employers. Also see the list dated 9/ 2002.at
http://www.buddybuddy.com/d-p-1.html ,

As with traditional working spouses, lower-paid domestic partners may not have
been able to afford to enroll their HIV+ partners (i.e., ADAP clients) in the workplace
health plan. But even higher income ones may not have been aware that the benefit
is available---or simply viewed enrolling in ADAP (at a big cost to ADAP's budget
but not their own !) as more convenient for them than enrolling in the employer plan.

Screening an ADAP caseload and new applicants for this type of possible alternate 
coverage will be even more labor-intensive than screening those with traditional
working spouses. ADAP enrollees and applicants must be asked whether they have
live-in domestic partners; if such partners are working; where they're working; whether
the employer offers domestic partner health coverage; and what the plan premiums,
coverage and enrollment details are. As with traditional employed spouses, this
information might well also require directly contacting partners' job benefits offices to
secure details and arrange premium payment and enrollment. In some cases,
partners' sensitivities to contacting the workplace must be accommodated too.

Since ADAP enrollees and applicants with live-in domestic partners probably
outnumber those with traditional (straight) working spouses, this will be a new a
new---even if hard-to-develop---alternate health coverage source.
 

  3.

 
Special Case: Disabled Medicaid Patients Whose Eligibility Comes From
SSI
 
   

Many of the most costly disabled Medicaid patients enter the program  through
receipt of SSI. Therefore,  because the welfare offices do not take applications
for---or even have case files on, or individually-assigned eligibility caseworkers for---
SSI recipients, Medicaid must do even more work to develop these cases.
This is
because among the SSI/Medicaid caseload will be found the greatest concentration
of the very costliest patients---
yet patients who are far  more likely than average
Medicaid clients to have a middle class birth origin.

This means that their parents are likely to have employer health coverage, which
could be extended to them to help defray Medicaid expenses. Moreover, SSI's
income-counting methodology for the earnings of spouses and parents of SSI
recipients is extraordinarily generous compared with income-counting practices for
those Medicaid-only cases handled by welfare. SSI’s caseload thus will include
many disabled cases with spouses and parents who have earnings above the levels
ordinarily encountered in the welfare disabled caseload. This, too, means that such
spouses and parents will be all the more likely to have been offered employer plan
health coverage for their dependents. Such cases therefore must receive
individualized attention to ascertain whether there is un-taken-up dependent
coverage in a spouse's or parent's job health plan that could significantly reduce
Medicaid's great cost exposure for these patients' care if such coverage were now
elected and premiums paid for it.
 
But, again, the absence of welfare case files for the SSI Medicaid group means
that burdensome administrative work will have to be done-but it will  be well worthwhile
in terms of the high medical costs that Medicaid can
potentially avoid by enrollment in
un-taken-up employer plans.i.e. Special Cases: Disabled SSDI Beneficiaries Returning
to Work Under Ticket to Work Medicaid Buy-in and Disabled Former SSI Recipients
Returning to Work with Section 1619(b) Medicaid Coverage

The 1997 Balanced Budget Act (BBA) and the 1999 Ticket to Work and Work
Incentives Improvement Act (TWWIIA) both give states the option of offering Medicaid,
at siding scale premiums, to disabled persons on SSDI to return to work with earnings
well into the mid-range (states can set allowable income levels as high as $45,000 or
even more). And Section 1619(b) of the Social Security Act has long offered SSI
recipients continued Medicaid coverage when they return to work and their earnings
rise above the SSI eligibility level. State-by-state upper allowable earnings thresholds
under Section 1619(b) vary---they are generally in the high teens up to about $35,000
---but those with extraordinarily high medical are allowed higher earnings.

Section 1619(b) continued Medicaid coverage is in effect in all states, while the BBA
and TWWIIA Medicaid buy-ins have been implemented in about half the states. Various
studies and program statistics show that  large majorities of both classes of work
returnees consist of those who’ve secured only menial, low-paid, part-time and
intermittent work. (Many participants have educations, work experience and disabilities
that effectively limit earning capacity---and large numbers of mentally challenged
persons have work interruptions linked to their disabilities.) Only a minority (so far)
secures the kind of quality full-time, or at least half time, jobs that offer employer-
sponsored health insurance.

An important study of the TWWIIA provisions, Medicaid Buy-in Program:
Quantitative Measures of Enrollment Trends and Participant Characteristics in
2002
(see the Ticket to Work “professional” Medicaid pages at
www.cms.hhs.gov ,
notes that while at least 70% of TWWIIA buy-in participants have Medicare (which
is primary to Medicaid and thus serves to reduce state financial  exposure), less
than 10% appear to have private health insurance (also primary to Medicaid; this is
presumably employer group health coverage acquired during the work attempt,
although some of this may represent the small minority of married clients being
covered as dependents by their healthy, employed spouses). Even a large minority
of Section 1619(b) recipients are also Medicare-eligible too because they received
SSDI awards below the SSI level (and because Medicare can and does continue
indefinitely
for still-disabled clients who leave SSDI to return to work), although
there’s even less data on the proportion of them that acquire employer insurance.

Because ---even before they return to work---the great bulk of TWWIIA participants
already
consume state Medicaid dollars (on regular Medicaid, via waivers or through
on-and-off spend down coverage, with any Medicare being primary to Medicaid)
and because Section 1619(b) recipients do too (more often without any primary
Medicare
coverage reducing state Medicaid payments), any private health coverage
acquired through the new employment represents an important, often-overlooked
source of significant state Medicaid savings. And Section 1619(b) work attempts have
the added advantage that such employment adds to clients’ FICA-taxed work records---
which can therefore make previously-ineligible clients fully- and currently-insured for
SSDI, and therefore, for Medicare
, further reducing future state Medicaid expenses.

TWWIIA clients apply through state welfare agencies and almost always also have
state or contract  vocational rehabilitation counselors as well. Hence, they have both
state case file information on hand and state workers who manage their eligibility.
Section 1619(b) recipients, however, are often serviced only by SSA---with only
their names and little more being transmitted electronically to states for Medicaid card
issuance in most cases---and thus many of them lack useful state case files and/or
caseworkers. All this is important for states if they are to become far more proactive
in inquiring about, and fostering enrollment in, potentially available employer health
plans. Few states now seem to make much effort in this area---but, to save state funds,
they need to adopt for TWWIIA and Section 1619(b) participants the same screening
and enrollment measures outlined for spouses in the paragraphs above.

States can and should promote work returns for many, many more TWWIIA and
Section 1619(b) clients, giving greater attention to targeting those with potential for
sustained, full-time employment (and thus the probability an offered employer health
plan). For both of them---and in cases where Section 1619(b) work generates a
previously unavailable Medicare entitlement for a client once on Medicaid alone---
states can then exercise the kind of vigorous screening and case management that
will reduce state Medicaid costs through more comprehensive acquisitions of offered
employer health coverage and Medicare.
 

  4.


 
Special Cases: Disabled SSDI Beneficiaries Returning to Work Under Ticket to
Work Medicaid Buy-in and Disabled Former SSI Recipients Returning to Work
with
Section 1619(b) Medicaid Coverage
 
    The 1997 Balanced Budget Act (BBA) and the 1999 Ticket to Work and Work
Incentives Improvement Act (TWWIIA) both give states the option of offering Medicaid,
at siding scale premiums, to disabled persons on SSDI to return to work with earnings
well into the mid-range (states can set allowable income levels as high as $45,000 or
even more). And Section 1619(b) of the Social Security Act has long offered SSI
recipients continued Medicaid coverage when they return to work and their earnings
rise above the SSI eligibility level. State-by-state upper allowable earnings thresholds
under Section 1619(b) vary---they’re generally in the high teens up to about $35,000--
but those with extraordinarily high medical are allowed higher earnings.

Section 1619(b) continued Medicaid coverage is in effect in all states, while the BBA
and TWWIIA Medicaid buy-ins have been implemented in about half the states. Various
studies and program statistics show that large majorities of both classes of work
returnees consist of those who’ve secured only menial, low-paid, part-time and
intermittent work. (Many participants have educations, work experience and disabilities
that effectively limit earning capacity---and large numbers of mentally challenged
persons have work interruptions linked to their disabilities.) Only a minority (so far)
secures the kind of quality full-time, or at least half time, jobs that offer employer-
sponsored health insurance more comprehensive acquisitions of offered employer
health coverage and Medicare.

An important study of the TWWIIA provisions, Medicaid Buy-in Program:
Quantitative Measures of Enrollment Trends and Participant Characteristics in
2002 (see the Ticket to Work “professional” Medicaid pages at www.cms.hhs.gov),
notes that while at least 70% of TWWIIA buy-in participants have Medicare (which
is primary to Medicaid and thus serves to reduce state financial exposure), less than
10% appear to have private health insurance (also primary to Medicaid; this is
presumably employer group health coverage acquired during the work attempt
although some of this may represent the small minority of married clients being
covered as dependents by their healthy, employed spouses). Even a large minority
of Section 1619(b) recipients are also Medicare-eligible too because they received
SIDE awards below the SSI level (and because Medicare can and does continue
indefinitely for still-disabled clients who leave SSDI to return to work), although there’s
even less data on the proportion of them that acquire employer insurance.

Because ---even before they return to work---the great bulk of TWWIIA participants
already consume state Medicaid dollars (on regular Medicaid, via waivers or through
on-and-off spend down coverage, with any Medicare being primary to Medicaid) and
because Section 1619(b) recipients do too (more often without any primary Medicare
coverage reducing state Medicaid payments), any private health coverage acquired
through the new employment represents an important, often-overlooked source of
significant state Medicaid savings. And Section 1619(b) work attempts have the
|added advantage that such employment adds to clients’ FICA-taxed work records---
which can therefore make previously-ineligible clients fully- and currently-insured for
SSDI, and therefore, for Medicare, further reducing future state Medicaid expenses.
TWWIIA clients apply through state welfare agencies and almost always also have state
or contract vocational rehabilitation counselors as well. Hence, they have both state
case file information on hand and state workers who manage their eligibility. Section
1619(b) recipients, however, are often serviced only by SSA---with only their names
and little more being transmitted electronically to states for Medicaid card issuance in
most cases---and thus many of them lack useful state case files and/or caseworkers.

All this is important for states if they are to become far more proactive in inquiring
about, and fostering enrollment in, potentially available employer health plans. Few
states now seem to make much effort in this area---but, to save state funds, they
need to adopt for TWWIIA and Section 1619(b) participants the same screening
and enrollment measures outlined for spouses in the paragraphs above.
States can and should promote work returns for many, many more TWWIIA and
Section 1619(b) clients, giving greater attention to targeting those with potential for
sustained, full-time employment (and thus the probability an offered employer health
plan). For both of them---and in cases where Section 1619(b) work generates a
previously unavailable Medicare entitlement for a client once on Medicaid alone---
states can then exercise the kind of vigorous screening and case management that
will reduce state Medicaid costs through
 
  5.

 

Enrollment/Enrollment Changes Whenever Requested by State Health
Programs
 
    When un-taken-up enrollment of a dependent who has become a state health
program beneficiary is discovered, current provisions in almost all employer plans
require the employee to await the next “open season” to enroll or add dependent
coverage. Otherwise, enrollment or enrollment changes are only allowed when first
employed; upon marriage or the death or divorce of spouse; upon the birth or adoption
of a child; and (sometimes) upon moving out of an HMO service area, the loss of
Medicaid, becoming Medicare-eligible, or the resumption of full time studies by a child
over 18 who is still under the older age (e.g., 22 or even 23) permitted for children in
college.

As a result, an aggressive state program to identify and foster enrollment in employer
health plans will be heavily burdened with labor-intensive filing, diarying, re-verifying
information and other bulky red tape if forced to await those next-scheduled, but often
differing, open seasons in multiple employer health plans. And, of course, cost
avoidances and recoveries will be greatly reduced where necessary enrollment must
be delayed for months in most cases (and for nearly a full year in the worst cases).
All this can be overcome----and state cost avoidances and recoveries can be
immediately put into effect and employers can be least inconvenienced---by enacting
a state statute requiring all health insurance, claims payment administration and
managed care contracts of employers doing business in the state to honor an additional,
 unique, special “open season” for enrollment changes: namely, those enrollment
changes, whenever requested by, or on behalf of, state health programs. Once
such a law takes effect for future new contract years, states will be able to enroll their
clients at once in available employer group plans and begin to realize savings.

As an important corollary, state legislation needs to include ironclad subrogations and
overrides of any private plans’ (or claims administrators’ or benefit administrators’)
claims-submission time deadlines or claims format rules; prior authorization or
generic substitution requirements (meeting whatever the state rule is should
automatically qualify); enrolled or preferred provider participation restrictions
(provider enrollment with the state program must be an automatically accepted
substitute); and hospital admission authorizations (again, the state’s authorization
must be automatically honored) for both first payer and pay-and-chase recovery
claims. For a study which only begins to touch upon the need for, and depth of,
these necessary reforms, see Medicaid Recovery of Pharmacy Payments from
Liable Third Parties (OEI-03-00-00030; August, 2001), Office of the Inspector
General, US Department of  Health and Human Services at http://www.dhhs.gov/oig.

But these recommended reforms to achieve third party liability savings---standing
purely alone on their own naked merits---could well attract fatal opposition from
pro-business legislators concerned about administrative and cost burdens to be
imposed on employers.

On the other hand, it is precisely these same reforms which are needed to
strengthen the increasingly important medical support component of state child
support programs. And fortunately it is those same legislators who are sympathetic
to possible burdens on business who are also the most devoted to beefing up child
support enforcement not only to aid single, custodial mothers. Even more, they
want to prevent and reduce public welfare and Medicaid costs they see as caused
by illegitimacy, single-parenthood, family breakup and many parents’ consequent
failure to pay child support!  State third party liability reforms may well be immunized
from being (fatally) seen as burdens to business by presenting them as housekeeping,
technical amendments to state child support law.
 
Section D: Electing the Medicaid Eligibility Option to Offer COBRA Premium Payments
to Newly-Disabled and Newly-Unemployed Individuals and Families

"Painless " TOC Medicaid Main Page  


“Painless” Administrative Ways For States With Budget Shortfalls to Preserve or
 Increase Medicaid and S-CHIP Program Funding
Section C
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